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The global financial crisis of 2008 and the following public
uproar over offshore tax evasion and corporate aggressive
tax planning scandals gave rise to unprecedented interna-
tional cooperation on tax information exchange and coordi-
nation on corporate tax reforms. At the behest of the G20,
the OECD developed a comprehensive package of ‘consen-
sus-based’ policy reform measures aimed to curb base ero-
sion and profit shifting (BEPS) by multinationals and to
restore fairness and coherence to the international tax sys-
tem. The legitimacy of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project, how-
ever, has been widely challenged. This paper explores the
validity of the legitimacy concerns raised by the various
stakeholders regarding the OECD/G20 BEPS Project.
Keywords: base erosion and profit shifting, OECD, G20,
legitimacy, international tax reform
1 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008 and the following
public uproar over offshore tax evasion and corporate
aggressive tax planning scandals gave rise to unprece-
dented international cooperation on tax information
exchange and coordination on corporate tax reforms.
Developing and industrialised rich countries alike have
aligned themselves with the general tax policy direction
set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to create a fairer and more trans-
parent global tax environment. At the behest of the
G20, the OECD also developed a comprehensive pack-
age of ‘consensus-based’1 policy reform measures aimed
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1. OECD, Explanatory Statement (2015), OECD/G20 Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting Project.
to curb base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS)2 with
respect to multinational corporations, which is based on
three key pillars: introducing coherence of corporate
income tax at the international level, reinforcing sub-
stance requirements in the existing international stand-
ards, and improving tax transparency as well as certainty
and predictability for businesses.3 Launched in July
2013, the BEPS Project is based on the OECD’s 15-
point Action Plan4 that needed to be addressed and
delivered by October 2015. Given the ambitious time-
frame of the BEPS Project, during which discussion
drafts were released and finalised one after another at a
staggering speed with little time allowed for public com-
ments, and the divergent views of capital importing and
capital exporting countries on a vast array of interna-
tional tax issues addressed in the Project, one might,
however, wonder whether true consensus could be
reached under such circumstances. As more and more
countries are jumping on the OECD/G20 BEPS band-
wagon and having committed themselves to the compre-
hensive BEPS Package and the ‘timely, consistent and
widespread’ implementation thereof,5 the OECD and
the G20 might have successfully attempted to change
the international tax landscape. At the time of writing of
this paper, ninety countries have joined the Inclusive
Framework for BEPS Implementation, representing
more than 90% of the world’s economy and more than
75% of the world’s population.6
The global endorsement of the BEPS Package and its
implementation through domestic laws and tax treaty
provisions in a coordinated manner is remarkable in
many ways. For a start, governments are generally
reluctant to relinquish their taxing power given the
unique status it is asserted with the notion of sovereign-
ty and ultimately with statehood itself.7 Taxation is not
2. According to the OECD, BEPS ‘refers to tax planning strategies that
exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to
locations where there is little or no economic activity or value creation’,
<https:// www. oecd. org/ dac/ financing -sustainable -development/ Addis
%20flyer%20 -%20BEPS. pdf> (July 2015).
3. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), at
13-14, and OECD, Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 12 – 2015 Final
Report (2015), at 3.
4. OECD (2013), above n. 3.
5. See the G20 Leaders’ Hangzhou Communiqué of 4-5 September 2016,
at para. 19.
6. <www. oecd. org/ tax/ beps/ inclusive -framework -on -beps -composition.
pdf> (20 November 2016).
7. As observed by Rosenbloom, ‘no area of law is closer to the subject of
sovereignty than taxation’. H.D. Rosenbloom, ‘Sovereignty and the
Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’, 20 Canada-Uni-
ted States Law Journal 267 (1994).
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only concerned with the generation of a country’s
domestic revenue, but it also creates and reflects the
‘social contract’ between the nation-state and its constit-
uents.8 The importance of fiscal self-determination in
the global tax debate may be illustrated by the earlier,
often perceived ‘failed’9 attempt of the OECD to rewrite
the international tax system in its project on harmful tax
practices in the late 1990s,10 which has been criticised
for violating the sovereignty of nations, in particular low
tax and secrecy jurisdictions, over their fiscal affairs.11
Not surprisingly, the OECD/G20 BEPS Project has
also raised some fiscal sovereignty concerns, most nota-
bly among G20 members themselves.12 In the United
States, Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives, has called for a united front from the US Treasury
against the BEPS Project, which is, in his words,
‘attempting to basically grab a tax base of our [US]
domestic corporations’.13 Other major Western econo-
mies in the G20, such as France, the United Kingdom
and Australia, are trying to protect their tax autonomy
8. See A. Christians, ‘Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract’, 18 Min-
nesota Journal of International Law 99 (2008).
9. The OECD’s harmful tax competition initiative was based on the 1998
report, which contained 19 wide-ranging recommendations to counter-
act tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes (collectively refer-
red to as ‘harmful tax practices’), including coordinated defensive meas-
ures that could be applied to tax havens. In June 2000, the OECD
released a controversial blacklist of 35 jurisdictions labelled as tax
havens, which was received with much criticism externally as well as
internally. Under the newly elected Bush administration, the then-Secre-
tary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill announced a re-evaluation of the Uni-
ted States’ participation in the OECD’s campaign against harmful tax
practices. His statement further reads that ‘the United States does not
support efforts to dictate to any country what its own tax rates or tax
system should be, and will not participate in any initiative to harmonise
world tax systems. The United States simply has no interest in stifling
the competition that forces governments – like businesses – to create
efficiencies’. Thus basically withdrawing the U.S. support. <https://
www. treasury. gov/ press -center/ press -releases/ Pages/ po366. aspx> (10
May 2001). From that moment onwards, the OECD sang a different,
softer tune: it has abandoned the central goal of the initiative – the mit-
igation of the harmful effects of tax ‘poaching’, i.e. when one country
redirects capital and financial flow and the corresponding revenue from
the other countries by bidding aggressively for the tax base that ‘rightly’
belongs to those other countries –, backed down on its call for sanctions
to be applied against uncooperative tax havens and reduced its aim to
only securing commitments to exchange information between jurisdic-
tion on civil tax and criminal matters. According to Sharman, the OECD
has thus failed to achieve the 1998 report’s original aim to regulate
international tax competition. ‘By 2002, not only had the OECD failed
to convince tax havens of the error of their ways, but it had also failed
to convince key sectors of the international audience of the wisdom and
justice of its arguments relative to those of its opponents.’ J.C. Shar-
man, Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation
(2006), at 71.
10. OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998).
11. See e.g. A. Townsend Jr., ‘The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Coercive Efforts to
Control Tax Competition’, 25 Fordham International Law Journal 215
(2001), K. Carlson, ‘When Cows Have Wings: An Analysis of the
OECD’s Tax Haven Work as It Relates to Globalization, Sovereignty and
Privacy’, 35 John Marshall Law Review 163 (2002), V.E. James, ‘Twen-
ty-First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM
Countries of their Tax and Economic Policy Sovereignty’, 34 University
of Miami Inter-American Law Review 1 (2002), M. Littlewood, ‘Tax
Competition: Harmful to Whom?’, 26 Michigan Journal of Internation-
al Law 162 (2004).
by engaging in unilateral actions, which in turn have
been criticised by other participants in the BEPS
Project, especially the United States.14 While endorsing
the BEPS initiative, the EU, as a member of the G20, is
attempting to secure its own relevance in the global tax
policymaking. The Commission’s ambitious agenda to
tackle corporate tax avoidance and harmful tax competi-
tion has been generally criticised for going above and
beyond the OECD/G20 BEPS proposals. From the
more stringent rules on interest deduction, hybrid mis-
matches and Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC)
legislation, to the proposed additional measures outside
the BEPS Package, such as the (now abandoned)
‘switch-over clause’, a general anti-abuse rule and exit
taxation on transfers of assets and on migration of tax
residency, it was obvious that the European Commis-
sion (EC) envisioned a much more rigid framework to
address BEPS through its Anti Tax Avoidance Direc-
tive than that of the OECD’s. In particular, the EC’s
state aid investigations into the so-called ‘sweetheart tax
deals’ between multinationals and certain EU countries
have been criticised for undermining the BEPS consen-
sus and the G20 agenda to improve tax certainty.15 Iron-
ically, the BEPS initiative was set up to avoid uncoordi-
nated unilateral actions;16 however, the result is appa-
rently just the opposite. On the other side of the spec-
trum, emerging economies in the G20 are concerned
12. According to a report from the Mercatus Center, the BEPS Project is
infringing U.S. national sovereignty. The report concludes: ‘The United
States should lead other OECD countries by reforming its domestic tax
code and rejecting the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project.
Tax policy should remain an area of domestic decision-making, allowing
each country to choose a tax system that best fits its unique needs
within the global landscape. The international community should be
cautious about OECD attempts to eliminate tax competition by consoli-
dating international tax rules.’ J.J. Fichtner and A.N. Michel, ‘The
OECD’s Conquest of the United States: Understanding the Costs and
Consequences of the BEPS Project and Tax Harmonization’, Mercatus
Research, at 42 (2016).
13. K. Strassel, ‘Paul Ryan on the Prospect for a Tax Overhaul’, Wall Street
Journal, 21 June 2015.
14. US Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs
Robert Stack cautioned that the UK’s diverted profit tax (DPT) and the
Australia’s version of the DPT and the Multinational Anti-avoidance
Law (MAAL) would take the BEPS Project in ‘a disturbing direction’ and
finds it ‘hard to believe that the tax experts in both governments don’t
recognise the technical weakness of their legislation’. K.A. Bell, ‘U.S.
and the UK Delegates Differ on Their Evaluation of the BEPS Project’,
Bloomberg BNA (2015). France has also proposed to introduce a diver-
ted profit tax (or ‘Google tax’) modelled on the UK measure.
15. See A. Athanasiou, ‘Unilateral Actions Continues to Plague BEPS, Saint-
Amans Says’, Tax Notes (2016), and US Department of the Treasury,
‘White Paper on the European Commission’s Recent State Aid Investi-
gations of Transfer Pricing Rulings’, <https:// www. treasury. gov/
resource -center/ tax -policy/ treaties/ Documents/ White -Paper -State -Aid.
pdf> (2016).
16. See the testimony of Pascal Saint-Amans before the US Senate Commit-
tee and Finance: ‘Unilateral action by countries on an uncoordinated
basis, however, has the potential to replace the problem of non-taxa-
tion with the proliferation of uncoordinated legislative measures that
will lead to excessive compliance costs for MNEs, as well as the poten-
tial for double or multiple taxation of the same income, undermining
the existing consensus-based standards and replacing them with chaos.
It also has the potential to encourage protectionist measures that would
be detrimental to international trade.’ <www. finance. senate. gov/ imo/
media/ doc/ Testimony%20of%20Pascal%20Saint -Amans. pdf> (2014).
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that the BEPS framework will not properly protect the
sovereign taxation rights of developing and low-income
countries, as it ostensibly claimed to do.17 In an official
response to the UN BEPS questionnaire, India criti-
cised the OECD for addressing only the superficial
BEPS issues while sweeping the real ones under the car-
pet, which is weakening the effectiveness of the Project,
and implored the UN to take action to ‘prevent the
international taxation rules from getting unjustly
skewed in favour of the developed countries’, and in
particular ‘to take the interest of the developing coun-
tries and the base erosion and profit shifting faced by
them into account while carrying out work on BEPS’.18
With scepticism about the BEPS Project mounting in
Washington, DC, major OECD economies like France,
the United Kingdom and Australia going their own
ways (and more countries will likely follow suit in order
to protect their tax base),19 the EU attempting to outdo
the OECD by pushing forward an even more ambitious
fiscal agenda, and emerging economies like India
expressing their concerns of biased tax policies and
questioning the effectiveness of the proposed anti-BEPS
measures, it is quite remarkable that the G20 leaders
have actually endorsed the BEPS Package in the first
place.20 Rather, it seems that the BEPS Project is pre-
dominantly driven by the ambition of the OECD secre-
tariat than that of the G20’s, which makes the populari-
ty of the BEPS Project even more peculiar: why would
any country want to join the Inclusive Framework and
to sign the Multilateral Instrument where they have de
facto no or little influence in the development thereof?
And by doing so, how can governments of the countries
legitimise their decision towards their electorate? These
questions may be even more poignant for countries that
17. The BEPS Project is built on the premise to ‘restore the trust of ordinary
people in the fairness of their tax system, to level the playing field
among business, and to provide governments with more efficient tools
to ensure the effectiveness of their sovereign tax policies’. OECD
(2015), above n. 1, at 4. Oxfam’s briefing paper, however, suggests
that the BEPS Project, like any other (ongoing) OECD-led tax reforms,
will not benefit developing countries. Oxfam, Business Among Friends;
Why Corporate Tax Dodgers Are Not Yet Losing Sleep over Global Tax
Reform, 185 Oxfam Briefing Paper, at 14 (2014).
18. <www. un. org/ esa/ ffd/ tax/ Beps/ CommentsIndia_ BEPS. pdf> (2014).
19. Some other G20 countries have already taken unilateral measures to
address BEPS issues in the digital economy. The Indian 6% Equalization
Levy on digital e-commerce transactions, the Turkish concept of an
‘electronic place of business’ for tax purposes and the Indonesian circu-
lar on the delivery of application and/or content services through the
Internet (‘OTT Circular Letter’) have also been viewed as uncoordinated
unilateral actions that are undermining the BEPS consensus, as the final
BEPS Action 1 report did not recommend introducing such measures in
advance of the completion of the BEPS Project. OECD, Addressing the
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 – 2015 Final Report
(2015), at 13.
20. At the Antalya summit, the G20 leaders committed to the implementa-
tion of the BEPS Project. <www. oecd. org/ g20/ meetings/ antalya/ g20 -
leaders -endorse -oecd -measures -to -crackdown -on -tax -loopholes -
reaffirm -its -role -in -ensuring -strong -sustainable -and -inclusive -growth.
htm> (16 November 2015). The G20 Finance Ministers endorsed the
Inclusive Framework for the implementation of the BEPS package in
February 2016.
were not represented in the BEPS-44 group,21 since
they were not at all involved in the decision-making
process during the BEPS Project, but only until after
the agenda had been set, the action points were agreed
on, the content of the initiatives had been decided and
the final reports were delivered. As ‘BEPS Associates’,
these countries ‘are required to commit to the compre-
hensive BEPS Package and its consistent implementa-
tion and to pay an annual member’s fee to cover the
costs of the framework’. In return, they will now be
bestowed with the honour to work alongside with the
OECD and G20 members, supposedly ‘on an equal
footing’, to further develop standards in respect of some
remaining BEPS issues and to review and monitor the
effective implementation of the agreed minimum stand-
ards.22 Not only would it prove to be a daunting task to
translate the combined BEPS reports and related docu-
ments into legislation, which is far more challenging for
developing and low-income countries considering their
limited resources, but also to expect that non-OECD
non-G20 countries will meekly follow a policy frame-
work where they took no part in the prior decision-mak-
ing thereof, ensure its ‘widespread, consistent and effec-
tive implementation’,23 and foot the bill of that frame-
work is, as India put it, ‘somewhat patronising’24
indeed. Yet, despite the condescending undertone, con-
siderable compliance costs, apparent lack of democratic
legitimacy,25 fiscal sovereignty concerns,26 possible
biased tax agenda and potentially ineffective measures,
this has remarkably not refrained these countries from
committing themselves to the comprehensive BEPS
package.
21. The BEPS-44 countries comprise of the then 34 OECD member states,
the 8 non-OECD G20 countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indone-
sia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa), and 2 OECD accession
countries (Colombia and Latvia, although the latter became a full mem-
ber of the OECD on 1 July 2016). These countries worked together on
an equal footing with the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), the
steering body for the BEPS Project, to deliver the consensus based deliv-
erables of the BEPS Action Plan. See <www. oecd. org/ ctp/ beps -2014 -
deliverables -information -brief. pdf> (2014).
22. OECD, Background Brief – Inclusive Framework for BEPS Implementa-
tion (2016).
23. G20 Shanghai Communiqué of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors Meeting of 27 February 2016, at para. 7.
24. India remarked that the OECD’s BEPS Project-approach of ‘expecting
developing countries to implement all the decisions made by the devel-
oped countries appears to be somewhat patronising and should be
avoided’, above n. 18.
25. Essers considers that despite the fact that the OECD wants to make the
BEPS-process ‘inclusive and effective’ by means of consulting all rele-
vant stakeholders and keeping them informed, it lacks (deliberative)
democratic legitimacy as envisioned by Habermas. In his opinion, not
only are countries unequally involved in the decision making process,
but consultation by itself does not equate to participative decision-mak-
ing. Furthermore, there is no true interactive involvement of national
parliaments and citizens in the BEPS-process (thus lacking direct demo-
cratic legitimacy). P. Essers, ‘International Tax Justice between Machia-
velli and Habermas’, Bulletin for International Taxation 54, at 57
(2014). See also C.A.T. Peters, On the Legitimacy of International Tax
Law (2014) and I.J. Mosquera Valderrama, ‘Legitimacy and the Making
of International Tax Law: The Challenges of Multilateralism’, 7 World
Tax Journal 344 (2015).
26. A. Postma and J. Schwarz, ‘BEPS and the Sovereignty of Nations’, 83
ASA 783 (2015).
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It’s arguably true that the BEPS Project emerged in the
eye of a perfect storm: the powerful concurrence of
high-impact events like the global economic crisis, fiscal
austerities and a series of tax scandals, spotlighted by
the lobby of civil society groups and the extensive media
coverage thereof, which prompted not only public pro-
tests but also parliamentary hearings, fuelled the public
debate on ‘fair share of tax’ and served as a catalyst that
propelled countries all over the world to join the BEPS
initiative despite its widespread criticism.
In the light of the above, this paper explores the validity
of the legitimacy concerns raised by the various stake-
holders regarding the OECD/G20 BEPS Project. Sec-
tion 2 will address the democratic deficit complains
lodged against the OECD/G20 BEPS Project. Section 3
will evaluate the legitimacy concerns of the BEPS
Project and Section 4 will provide a conclusion.




Is the OECD/G20 BEPS Project legitimate? Since the
launch of the Project in July 2013, tax academia, politi-
cians and civil society groups, such as Oxfam Interna-
tional, Tax Justice Network and Christian Aid, have
raised this question and subsequently given their – often
negative – responses thereto. While some evaluate the
legitimacy of the Project on the decision-making process
within the OECD/G20 or on the citizenry’s active par-
ticipation and deliberation, others judged the Project
primarily on the quality of its policy outcomes.
This section explores the arguments surrounding the
‘democratic deficits’ complaints lodged against the G20
and the OECD as global tax regulators in the BEPS
Project and the norms reflecting in the BEPS Project
itself. To bring some structure amidst the multitude of
different perceived legitimacy flaws in the global tax
policymaking in the BEPS Project, I use José E. Alvar-
ez’s nuanced typology.27 Following the work of Alvarez,
this paper divides the putative democratic deficits com-
plaints into three types: 1. ‘vertical’ (regarding the dis-
connect between international law-making and the dem-
ocratic law-making process ‘below’ at the national level),
2. ‘horizontal’ (concerning the relations between inter-
national organisations and states and between states) and
3. ‘ideological’ (reflecting the dominant ideology of
Western governmental elites). It should, however, be
noted that certain democratic deficit complaints may
rely on more than one type because, as Alvarez
remarked, these three forms of critiques may converge
27. J.E. Alvarez, ‘Introducing the Themes’, (Introduction to Symposium on
‘Democratic Theory and International Law’), 38 Victoria University of
Wellington Law Review 159 (2007). See also S. Wheatley, The Demo-
cratic Legitimacy of International Law (2010), at 15-16 and 22-23.
in practice.28 Also, given the divergent conceptions of
legitimacy and democracy held by critics of the BEPS
Project, the form of their democratic deficit complaints
may be inconsistent. In the following subparagraphs, I
will discuss each of these types separately.
2.2 Vertical Complaints
2.2.1 Introduction
Alvarez posits three types of vertical complaints. First,
that international law-making by international institu-
tions is undemocratic because it fails to replicate in any
meaningful way domestic democratic governance pro-
cesses and other structural components, such as elector-
al representation, checks and balances between legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches, transparency,
accountability and deliberative participation. Second,
that the nature of global governance makes it possible
for decision-makers to adopt norms that do not have
domestic support. Third, that international law-making
process fail to respect the substantive rights associated
with democratic governance, such as due process and
other human rights.29 Critics of the OECD/G20 BEPS
Project focused primarily on the first two types of verti-
cal complaints and have, to my knowledge, not raised
any concerns regarding the possible infringement of the
Project with human rights.30
2.2.2 First Type of ‘Vertical Complaints’: Gaps in
Democratic Governance Processes
2.2.2.1 Flaws in Representational Authority
Although the G20 and the OECD are perfectly entitled
to establish policy norms among their member coun-
tries, their aspiration to become ‘the leader of the global
economy and financial system’ respectively ‘a global
standard setting body’ is challenged by the absence of
legitimate authority in the wider world. Created by the
G7 to become the ‘premier forum for international
cooperation on the most important issues of the global
economic and financial agenda’,31 the G20 brings
together nineteen ‘systematically important’32 advanced
and emerging economies from every region of the globe,
plus the EU, that represents roughly 90% of global
gross domestic product, 80% of world trade (including
28. Alvarez, above n. 27.
29. Ibid. See also Wheatley, above n. 27, at 23-28.
30. BEPS practices, however, do have a negative impact on the enjoyment
of human rights as they deprive governments of the recourses needed
to alleviate poverty, eradicate child labour, reduce illiteracy and gender
disparities, etc. As such, the BEPS Project has the potential to signifi-
cantly improve human rights conditions, particularly in the developing
world.
31. G20-website: <www. g20. org/ docs/ about/ about_ G20. html> (last vis-
ited 27 July 2016).
32. In their statement of 25 September 1999, G7 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors announced that they ‘propose to establish a
new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton
Woods institutional system, to broaden the dialogue on key economic
and financial policy issues among systemically significant economies and
promote cooperation to achieve stable and sustainable world economic
growth that benefits all’, the announcement of which led to the estab-
lishment of the G20. <www. library. utoronto. ca/ g7/ finance/
fm992509state. htm> (1999).
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EU intra-trade) as well as two-thirds of the world’s pop-
ulation.33 Based on the group’s ‘economic weight and
broad membership’, the G20 deems itself for having ‘a
high degree of legitimacy and influence over the man-
agement of the global economy and financial system’.34
However, the composition of the G20 membership is
problematic from a representational perspective because
the African region is grossly under-represented while
low-income countries and small, open economies are
completely absent.35 The official membership of the EU
in the G20 also reflects some legitimacy considerations,
as other regional organisations do not have an official
seat at the G20 table. As rightfully questioned by Nor-
wegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre: ‘South Afri-
ca is part of it, but not as a representative of Africa. Sau-
di Arabia is part of it, but not as a representative of the
Arab world. So why is the European Union represented
in addition to having four individual EU member states
and two others as observers?’36 Consequently, the legiti-
macy of EU’s membership in the G20 is also challenged,
both from within and without. While non-EU countries
complain about the over-representation of the EU in the
G20 in comparison to other regions of the world, EU
Member States that are excluded from the G20’s mem-
bership are sceptical about their lack of direct involve-
ment in the G20 decision-making process and fear that
the major EU economies that are members of G20 in
their own right (i.e. France, the United Kingdom, Ger-
many and Italy) will use the forum to increase their
influence within the EU.37 As such, the G20 process
could damage the trust among the Member States and
‘undermine the core of the European multilateral
project itself’.38
Like the G20, the legitimacy of the OECD’s authority
from a representational perspective has been ques-
tioned. Nicknamed ‘the rich man’s club’, the OECD is
neither inclusive with regard to its membership nor
operates in a political vacuum; its policies serve first and
33. See G20, above n. 31. The G20’s share of the global GDP, trade and
population includes all EU countries, although different opinions exist
whether the EU represents all its members in the G20.
34. See G20, above n. 31.
35. J. Vestergaard, ‘The G20 and Beyond: Towards Effective Global Eco-
nomic Governance’, DIIS Report 2011:04, at 6. Norwegian Foreign
Minister Jonas Gahr Støre described the G20 as ‘a self-appointed
group’, where its ‘composition is determined by the major countries and
powers. It may be more representative than the G7 or the G8, in which
only the richest countries are represented, but it is still arbitrary. We no
longer live in the 19th century, a time when the major powers met and
redrew the map of the world. No one needs a new Congress of Vien-
na.’ Jonas Gahr Støre in an interview conducted by M. Ertel, ‘Norway
Takes Aim at G-20: “One of the Greatest Setbacks Since World War
II”’, Der Spiegel, 22 June 2010.
36. Støre, above n. 35.
37. See P. Debaere and J. Orbie, ‘The EU in the Gx System’, in K.E Jørgen-
sen and K.V. Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European
Union and International Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power, (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2013) 311.
38. J. Jokela, ‘The G-20: A Pathway to Effective Multilateralism?’, Chaillot
Papers 2011:125, at 67-68.
foremost the interest of the member countries.39 As the
self-proclaimed ‘leader in setting standards and guide-
lines in respect of international tax matters’,40 the
OECD has an influence that reaches far beyond the cur-
rent thirty-five member countries it serves. In fact, the
OECD actively seeks out and engages with non-OECD
countries in order to secure their commitment in the
implementation of the OECD’s instruments, standards
and guidelines. However, the decision-making power is
vested in the OECD Council alone, which is composed
of one representative per member country and a repre-
sentative of the European Commission. Non-OECD
countries are not represented in the Council nor partici-
pate in its decision-making in any meaningful way. Crit-
ics therefore argue that the OECD is not the appropri-
ate forum for discussions and decisions on international
tax matters. While welcoming the work the OECD has
undertaken through its BEPS Project, UK lawmakers
reiterated their concerns: ‘However, international tax
discussions must be fully reflective of international con-
cerns, including those of developing countries, and we
remain concerned that the OECD – due to its composi-
tion – is not adequately reflecting the needs of the poor-
est countries in its policy outcomes’.41
2.2.2.2 Flaws in Governance Structure
The governance structure of the G20 and the OECD
lacks the institutional components associated with rep-
resentative electoral polities. The G20, in particular, is
‘severely flawed’42 as it does not possess legal personali-
ty nor does it have a treaty or charter in which the com-
petences and procedural principles of the organisation
are defined, including formalised rules for membership
and processes for decision-making and resolving dis-
putes. Nor does the G20 possess any formal mecha-
nisms either for reporting or for accountability to the
broader international community. The summit meetings
are held behind closed doors and the only way the pub-
lic can learn about the G20 leaders’ deliberations is
through their communiqués.43 Because of its informal
arrangement, institutional deficiencies and lack of
accountability and transparency, the legitimacy of the
39. The main aim of the OECD is to promote policies designed ‘to achieve
the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising
standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial sta-
bility, and thus to contribute to the development of the world econo-
my’, Article 1(a) of the Convention on the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Paris, 14 December 1960.
40. <www. oecd. org/ ctp/ tax -global/ setting -the -tax -agenda. htm> (last vis-
ited 31 July 2016).
41. UK House of Commons, International Development Committee, Tack-
ling Corruption Overseas (2016), at 26.
42. G. Helleiner, ‘Developing Countries, Global Financial Governance, and
the Group of Twenty’, available at <http:// fpif. org/ developing_
countries_ global_ financial_ governance_ and_ the_ group_ of_ twenty>
(2001).
43. K. Alexander, K. Lorez, M. Zobl & D. Thürer, ‘The Legitimacy of the
G20 – A Critique Under International Law’, available at: <http:// ssrn.
com/ abstract= 2431164>, at 14 (2014).
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G20 has been widely challenged.44 Furthermore, both
the G20 and the OECD do not have the authority to
impose binding tax rules or sanctions in the event of
non-compliance. Most significantly, both the G20 and
the OECD lack a parliament. In the words of Alvarez,
‘since there is no international parliament subject to
proportional representation of the peoples of the world,
international law-makers lack the ties to democratically
elected polities that legitimize law within
democracies’.45
To improve the governance of international tax, critics
like Oxfam have called for the establishment of a global
tax body along the lines of Vito Tanzi’s proposal of a
formal ‘World Tax Organisation’, which could impose
binding tax rules on nations.46 Others believe that the
United Nations Tax Committee should be upgraded to
an intergovernmental tax body.47 However, despite the
universal membership, the decision-making process
within the UN itself has often been criticised for being
‘undemocratic’ as it presumably lacks electoral repre-
sentation, principles of separation of powers, transpar-
ency and/or broad public participation.48 It is obvious
that proposals to elevate the BEPS Project to the level of
the UN do not resolve all the democratic deficits of
international law-making and the idea of establishing a
binding global tax institution for the governance of
international corporate taxes is most likely utopian. Both
Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, and
Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank, have
questioned the feasibility of such proposals. The former
warned that many countries in the world would ‘very
strongly oppose’ to the idea of surrendering their power
to a global tax body, as ‘levying taxation is considered as
an attribute to sovereignty’, while the latter is sceptical
about whether adding another institution would provide
a real solution to a problem.49 Self-serving as it may be,
the United States and other wealthy OECD countries
shared the World Bank’s view and opposed to the estab-
lishment of an intergovernmental body at the UN for
44. E.g. N. Woods, ‘The G20 Leaders and Global Governance’, GEG Work-
ing Paper 2010:59; Alexander, Lorez, Zobl & Thürer, above n. 43; J.
Rood, ‘Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimacy: The Case
of the G20 and Financial-Economic Cooperation’, in The Hague Insti-
tute for Global Justice and the Netherlands Institute of International
Relations ‘Clingendael’, ‘Special Report on Transnational Governance
and Democratic Legitimacy’ 67 (2014) and Vestergaard, above n. 35.
45. Alvarez, above n. 27.
46. Oxfam, above n. 17, at 15-16. Reference is made to V. Tanzi, ‘Is There
a Need for a World Tax Organisation?’, in A. Razin and E. Sadka (eds.),
The Economics of Globalization: Policy Perspectives from Public Eco-
nomics (1999) 173.
47. See e.g. K. Sadiq, on behalf of the BEPS Monitoring Group, ‘Presenta-
tion to the Enlarged Framework on BEPS of the OECD Committee on
Fiscal Affairs’, available at: <https:// bepsmonitoringgroup. files.
wordpress. com/ 2016/ 07/ presentation -to -cfa -if -june -2016. pdf> (2016);
Mosquera Valderrama, above n. 25. See also Oxfam’s proposal for an
intergovernmental UN tax body, signed by nearly 40 civil society
groups, available at: <www. oxfam. org. uk/ get -involved/ campaign -with -
us/ latest -campaign -news/ 2015/ 07/ un -tax -body -is -good -for -
everyone>.
48. Alvarez, above n. 27.
49. D. Smith, ‘IMF Chief Talks Panama Papers Fallout: Time to “Think Out-
side Box” on Global Tax’, The Guardian, 11 April 2016.
international cooperation in tax matters, including
through upgrading the existing Committee of Experts
on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. ‘Such a
body would substantially overlap with work that is
already taking place in other contexts, such as the IMF,
World Bank, African Tax Administration Forum
(ATF), CIAT and the OECD’.50
2.2.2.3 Flaws in Deliberative Processes
From a Habermasian outlook, the lack of active partici-
pation and deliberation of national parliaments and citi-
zens in the BEPS Project is problematic. As described
by former Dutch senator Peter Essers,
[p]arliaments can only discuss the results of the
OECD meetings with the ministers of the national
government; citizens can only hold their national par-
liamentarians accountable in elections every four
years. The business and civil society representatives
can only ‘comment’ on the different proposals, they
are not really part of the decision making process.
This means that there is no true interactive involve-
ment of national parliaments and citizens in the
OECD BEPS process.51
US Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch
has voiced this complaint on several occasions. In a
speech delivered at the Senate, Hatch criticised the
BEPS Project for moving well beyond its original man-
date and becoming a mechanism for rewriting global tax
strategies behind closed doors without the input or con-
sent of the US Congress. ‘Sure, the OECD has been
quite forthcoming in meeting with members and con-
gressional staff, but, in the actual BEPS deliberations,
all the decisions are being made by unelected bureau-
crats in Paris, and not by anyone from the Senate or
House of Representatives.’52 At a committee hearing
examining the OECD’s BEPS reports, senator Hatch
reminded the Obama Administration that
it is Congress – and Congress alone – that has the
ultimate authority to make changes to the U.S. tax
code. While the Treasury Department does have
broad regulatory authority under the law, that power
is not without limits. Even in those areas where
authority clearly exists for the administration to
promulgate regulations, it is virtually always better if
Congress is viewed as a partner in this process rather
than an adversary. And, in those instances where the
regulatory authority is less clear, congressional
involvement and approval is even more important to
50. US Statement to ECOSOC Special Meeting on International Coopera-
tion in Tax Matters, available at: <www. un. org/ esa/ ffd/ wp -content/
uploads/ 2015/ 04/ 2015esm -usa. pdf> (2015). See also S. Medhora,
‘Richer Nations Reject Call for Tough Tax Provisions at Foreign Aid
Conference’, The Guardian, 16 July 2015, and P. Rangaprasad and C.
Freymeyer, ‘One Year after Addis Ababa, Rich Countries Blocking UN
from Working on Tax, Again’, Financial Transparency Co, 21 July 2016.
51. Essers, above n. 25, at 57.
52. O. Hatch, Speech on the Senate floor, available at: <www. finance.
senate. gov/ chairmans -news/ in -speech -hatch -outlines -concerns -with -
oecd -international -tax -project> (16 July 2015).
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ensure that policy changes are viewed by the public
as legitimate.53
Although this critique might be rightfully made, the
staggering speed in which the BEPS Project evolved
makes it practically impossible for national parliaments
and citizenry to have a meaningful participation and
deliberation in the first place. Proponents of the BEPS
Project may, on the other hand, argue that states, not
persons, are party to the international law system.
According to Beitz, ‘international society is understood
as domestic society writ large, with states playing the
roles occupied by persons in domestic society’.54 In this
view, the absence of individual citizens in the interna-
tional decision-making process does not necessarily
undermine the BEPS Project’s legitimacy, as long as
they are represented by their elected government. This
argument, however, highlights the problematic legitima-
cy of the Project for those countries that were not repre-
sented in the BEPS-44 group.
2.2.3 Second Type of ‘Vertical Complaints’: Gaps in
Domestic Support
Another commonly perceived democratic deficit is the
possibility for unelected non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and special interest groups to bypass
national parliaments by lobbying for certain policies at
the international level and subsequently bring pressure
to governments.55 Critics therefore argue, for different
reasons, that multilateral institutions are illegitimate due
to their elite-driven agendas. While some worried about
the influence of the corporate elites on the policy-mak-
ing process in the BEPS Project,56 others are concerned
with the role of NGOs in the international tax justice
debate. NGOs like Tax Justice Network, Christian Aid
and Oxfam International have fuelled the public debate
on ‘international tax justice’, ‘fair share of tax’ and ‘cor-
porate social responsibility’, which was traditionally
reserved to tax practitioners and academia. Although the
NGOs have been criticised for influencing the public
opinion with ‘unjust, unfair and misleading
53. O. Hatch, Statement at Finance Hearing on OECD BEPS Reports, availa-
ble at: <www. finance. senate. gov/ chairmans -news/ hatch -statement -at -
finance -hearing -on -oecd -beps -reports> (1 December 2015).
54. C.R. Beitz, ‘Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics’,
33 International Organization 405, at 408 (1979).
55. See R. Keohane, S. Macedo & A. Moravcsik, ‘Democracy-Enhancing
Multilateralism’, 63 International Organization 1, at 3 (2009).
56. Oxfam, for example, argues that the business lobby has a dispropor-
tionate influence on the BEPS process, partly due to the ‘revolving door
between tax legislators and accountancy firms’ advisers’, where staff
could go back and forth from the OECD to private lobby firm that ‘has
an interest in influencing a policy process in which there might be a
conflict of interest’. Oxfam, above n. 17, at 10-12. In their analysis of
the public consultation process on BEPS Actions’ discussion drafts, Eber-
hartinger and Pututschnig concluded that ‘[c]omment letters were sub-
mitted predominantly by multinationals or their representative bodies,
by large accounting and law firms, and by expert organizations and lob-
bying groups, all operating from within OECD countries’. E. Eberhar-
tinger and M. Petutschnig, ‘The Scepticism of BRICS Practitioners on
the BEPS-Agenda’, available at: <https:// www. business. unsw. edu. au/
About -Site/ Schools -Site/ Taxation -Business -Law -Site/ Documents/ BEPS_
Agenda_ Scepticism. pdf> (last visited 25 July 2016).
arguments’,57 their role in the BEPS Project has been
significant. An important feature of the BEPS Project’s
proposal, the Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting that
requires multinational corporations to disclose financial
details about their operation in every country where
they are active, has reportedly been lobbied by NGOs.58
Interestingly, the OECD has warned its member coun-
tries of the lobbying risks in the domestic decision-mak-
ing process, as it could lead to ‘undue influence, unfair
competition, and policy capture to the detriment of the
public interests and effective public policies’.59 To
restore citizens’ trust in their national government and
political parties, the OECD Council adopted the 2010
Recommendation on Principles for Transparency and
Integrity in Lobbying,60 which is, in the words of the
OECD, an international instrument addressing major
risks in the public decision-making process related to
lobbying’. However, it is unclear whether these princi-
ples also apply to the decision-making process within
the OECD itself, in particular relating to ‘[t]he practice
of “revolving doors”, where [OECD] staff can slip
between related public and private sectors, threatens the
integrity of public decision-making by raising the risks




Horizontal complaints assert that ‘international law-
making is illegitimate to the extent it fails to treat sover-
eigns as horizontal equals’.62 This refers to the principle
of sovereign equality of States, which is incorporated in
57. On the emergence of NGOs in the international tax justice debate, Es-
sers cautioned that ‘the debate on international tax justice is increasing-
ly being polluted by unjust, unfair and misleading argument. Because
the discussion is no longer limited to tax experts, the risk increases that
these unjust, unfair and misleading aspects of the debate could have
significant impact on public opinion and on the responsible politicians
who ultimately have to take the decisions’. Essers, above n. 25, at 54.
58. See Brauner on the role of civil society in the BEPS Project in Y. Brauner,
‘BEPS: An Interim Evaluation’, World Tax Journal 10, at 35 (2014). The
idea of CbC-reporting by multinational corporations was first proposed
by Richard Murphy, founder of the Tax Justice Network. R. Murphy, ‘A
Proposed International Accounting Standard Reporting Turnover and
Tax by Location’, available at: <http:// visar. csustan. edu/ aaba/
ProposedAccstd. pdf> (2003). The G8, under the chairmanship of UK
Prime Minister David Cameron, called upon the OECD to develop a
common template for CbC-reporting (G8 Lough Erne Communiqué of
2013, at para. 25), which later has been included in the BEPS proposals.
See R. Murphy, ‘Country-By-Country Reporting’, in T. Pogge and K.
Mehta (eds.), Global Tax Fairness (2016) 96, at 96.
59. OECD, Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3: Imple-
menting the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobby-
ing (2014), at 21.
60. Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Transparency and
Integrity in Lobbying, at <http:// acts. oecd. org/ Instruments/
ShowInstrumentView. aspx ?InstrumentID= 256& Lang= en> (2010).
61. See the OECD-website <www. oecd. org/ publications/ lobbyists -
governments -and -public -trust -volume -3 -9789264214224 -en. htm>
(last visited 17 September 2016).
62. Alvarez, above n. 27.
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article 2, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter.63 In its Reso-
lution on the promotion of a democratic and equitable
international order, the UN General Assembly affirms
that such order must be ‘based on equal participation in
the decision-making process, interdependence, mutual
interest, solidarity and cooperation among all States’.64
In the context of the BEPS Project, the horizontal com-
plaints are not only understood as democratic deficits
reflecting in the relationship between the G20/OECD
and states and between states themselves, but it also
concerns the relationship between the G20 and the
OECD. In the following subparagraphs, I will discuss
these different relationships separately.
2.3.2 Relationship between the G20/OECD and States
and Between States
Not all countries are equally involved or have an equal
say in the OECD/G20 BEPS Project. A common com-
plaint lodged against international organisations is that
they ‘accord privileged status to those who hold the
purse-strings’ – a complaint that is not only directed at
the forms of international law-making, but also at its
unequal forms of enforcement.65 Being the largest budg-
et contributor (20.93% in 2016),66 the United States has
long enjoyed a position where it can exert its influence
on the tax policymaking in the OECD and ignore those
policies that are not consistent with the US interests. At
the G20/OECD BEPS press conference in Lima, short-
ly after the release of the BEPS package in 2015, US
Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew announced that the
United States ‘is proud to have played a leading role in
developing the BEPS recommendations. We were able
to advance our ideas in key areas such as limiting inter-
est deductions and pushing for improved dispute reso-
lution among countries’.67 At the same time, the United
States has no intention to sign the multilateral instru-
ment on tax treaty measures to tackle BEPS that is being
developed under Action 15 of the BEPS Action Plan,
unless it includes mandatory binding arbitration that the
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee is willing to
63. The principle of sovereign equality of States is further understood as:
‘All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties
and are equal members of the international community, notwithstand-
ing differences of an economic, social, political or other nature. In par-
ticular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
a. States are judicially equal;
b. Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
c. Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States;
d. The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are
inviolable;
e. Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political,
social, economic and cultural systems;
f. Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its
international obligations and to live in peace with other States.’
GA Res. 25/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
64. GA Res. 61/160, 19 December 2006, at cipher 4(e).
65. Alvarez, above n. 27.
66. See OECD, Member Countries’ Budget Contributions for 2016, availa-
ble at: <www. oecd. org/ about/ budget/ member -countries -budget -
contributions. htm> (2016).
67. Statement by Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew at the G-20/OCED BEPS
Press Conference, Lima, available at: <https:// www. treasury. gov/ press -
center/ press -releases/ Pages/ jl0204. aspx> (2015).
accept.68 In this respect, a decade-old speech made by
the former Secretary-General of the OECD, Donald J.
Johnston, still holds its value today:
Indeed, the global economic power of the United
States affords it the luxury of being able to ignore the
necessity of engaging in broad based multilateral
trade agreements. When others seem reluctant to
opening their markets and eliminating trade distort-
ing subsidies, the US may focus increasingly on bilat-
eral agreements that it can negotiate to its competi-
tive advantage, as a result of its economic muscle.
After all, it is logical for the largest gorilla in the
neighbourhood to take on the competition one or a
few at a time. Each country would behave likewise
were it to have the negotiating strength of the US.69
Given the global aim of the policies set out in the BEPS
Action Plan, the engagement of non-OECD countries in
the process is indispensable. In 2013, the OECD
acknowledged the need for greater involvement of major
non-OECD economies in order to accomplish the fif-
teen actions set forth in the BEPS Action Plan. As such,
the BEPS Project was launched to include the eight
non-OECD G20 countries (Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Afri-
ca) and two OECD Accession countries (Colombia and
Latvia)70 as ‘Associates’, where they can participate in
the Project on an equal footing with OECD members
(the BEPS-44 group). By becoming Associates, these
countries were expected to associate themselves with the
outcome of the BEPS Project. Some non-G20 non-
OECD countries were invited to participate in the
Project as ‘Invitees’ on an ad hoc basis, while many oth-
er countries have participated in the Project through
regional structured dialogues.71 According to the
OECD, over sixty countries and regional tax organisa-
tions were directly involved in the BEPS Project’s tech-
nical work.72 From this, the following could be dis-
cerned: (i) Associates were only involved in the BEPS
process after the agenda for the BEPS initiative had
been set and the content of the Action Plan had been
decided; (ii) Invitees and other non-OECD non-G20
countries have only a consultative role, which is not the
same as participative decision-making;73 and (iii) from
the current 193 UN member states in the world, less
68. See L.A. Sheppard and S.S. Johnston, ‘U.S. ‘Extremely Disappointed’ in
DPT and BEPS Output, Stack Says’, Tax Notes International (2015). On
the US decision to participate in discussions regarding the development
of a multilateral instrument, Robert Stack, US deputy assistant Treasury
secretary for international tax affairs, emphasised that this ‘by no means
foreshadows any decision about whether to eventually join in signing
such an instrument’. K.A. Bell, ‘Stack: U.S. to Participate in Multilateral
Tax Treaty Discussions’, Bloomberg BNA, 2 October 2015.
69. D.J. Johnston, ‘New Europe, New Frontiers, New Opportunities, New
Challenges’, Speech held at the 14th European Banking & Financial
Forum, Prague, 28-29 March 2006.
70. Latvia became a full member of the OECD on 1 July 2016.
71. OECD (2013), above n. 3, at 25; OECD (2016), above n. 22, at 2.
72. Ibid., at 2.
73. See Essers, above n. 25.
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than a third participated to varying extent in the BEPS
Project while the remainder were not at all involved.
Following the BEPS Project, two drafting groups were
established, tasked with the implementation of the com-
prehensive BEPS Package: one concerning the develop-
ment of a multilateral instrument that will allow coun-
tries to swiftly amend their existing bilateral tax treaties
in order to implement the tax treaty-related BEPS rec-
ommendation (the Ad Hoc group on the Multilateral
Instrument, with 31 December 2016 as the deadline for
deliverables)74 and another regarding a peer review and
monitoring framework on the effective implementation
of the agreed minimum standards (the Inclusive Frame-
work for BEPS Implementation). All relevant and inter-
ested countries were called upon to commit themselves
to the BEPS Package and were openly invited to join
these drafting groups. As ‘BEPS Associates’, countries
participating in the Inclusive Framework will work
alongside with the OECD and G20 members on an
equal footing to
develop standards in respect of remaining BEPS
issues; review the implementation of agreed mini-
mum standards through an effective monitoring sys-
tem; monitor BEPS issues, including tax challenges
raised by the digital economy; and facilitate the
implementation processes of the members by provid-
ing further guidance and by supporting development
of toolkits and guidance to support low-capacity
developing countries.75
In conclusion, only at the implementation stage of the
BEPS Package are all countries treated as ‘horizontal
equals’ in order to ensure its proper execution. What is
more, even when jurisdictions have decided not to join
the Inclusive Framework, they might run the risk of
being identified as ‘jurisdictions of relevance’, whose
adherence to the BEPS minimum standards will still be
required by the OECD in order to ensure a level-play-
ing field. This is, in my opinion, incompatible with the
principle of sovereign equality of states, in particular
with the doctrine that a state cannot be bound by the
decision of an international agency if it is not represen-
ted in its law-making body, let alone against its will.76
Although the BEPS policy outputs are not legally bind-
ing and countries can choose not to adopt them, there is
an expectation that countries, which are either part of
the consensus or singled out by the OECD as relevant
jurisdictions, shall implement them accordingly,77
which will then be monitored and reviewed by peer
countries. Besides, most countries are not as free as the
United States to ignore the politics and power of peer
74. OECD, Action 15: A Mandate for the Development of a Multilateral
Instrument on Tax Treaty Measures to Tackle BEPS (2015).
75. OECD (2016), above n. 22.
76. H. Kelsen, ‘The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for
International Organization’, 53 The Yale Law Journal Company Inc.
207 (1944), at 210.
77. OECD, Top 10 FAQ’s about BEPS, answer to question 4, available at:
<www. oecd. org/ ctp/ beps -frequentlyaskedquestions. htm> (last visited
10 August 2016).
pressure exerted by the G20 and the OECD, especially
when threatened with possible blacklisting and defen-
sive measures. As rightfully questioned by Essers, ‘to
what extent can a country afford to say no to such an
instrument? And will countries have any influence after
such an instrument has been developed?’78
2.3.3 Relationship between the G20 and the OECD
Although it is difficult to ascertain who has the actual
leadership of the Project – whether it was the OECD
that instilled the need to address BEPS in the G20’s
leaders or it was the G20 that instructed the OECD to
address BEPS – the relationship between the G20 and
the OECD has been, in the words of the OECD, ‘mutu-
ally beneficial’.79 As an informal forum without a per-
manent secretariat for institutional support for tax poli-
cy development, the G20 needs the OECD’s pool of
expertise and operational implementation and monitor-
ing capabilities to ensure the global effectiveness of the
BEPS Project, while securing its own position as the
leader in the global economy and financial system. On
the other hand, the G20’s high-level political attention
and commitment to the OECD’s tax agenda provides
the OECD greater certainty regarding budgetary contri-
butions to fulfil its mandate,80 while it also reinforces
the OECD’s relevance in the global tax policymaking
and helps disseminate the OECD’s BEPS policies across
the world. As asserted by Eccleston et al., ‘[i]t is in this
role as a handmaiden to the G20 in a super-ordinate
relationship that the OECD can and will have real influ-
ence’.81 Although this assertion might be true, the sym-
biotic relationship between the G20 and the OECD also
has some major drawbacks. The OECD is not mandated
to support the G20, yet it functions de facto as the sec-
retariat for the G20.82 After the G20 leaders have identi-
fied the need to prevent BEPS at the Los Cabos Sum-
mit in June 2012,83 which was opportunistically inter-
preted by the OECD secretariat as a clear political man-
date to advance its work on BEPS,84 the OECD began
feeding the G20 with action plan, reports, progress
updates and other contributions on a regular and consis-
tent basis. By enlisting the OECD’s technical support in
framing, developing and carrying out its policy priori-
78. Essers, above n. 25, at 57.
79. OECD, ‘OECD and the G20’, available at: <www. oecd. org/ g20/ about.
htm> (last visited 10 August 2016).
80. The OECD depends to a large extent on G20 members for its budget,
as it accounted for over 70% of the OECD’s total funding in 2016 (and
around 95% when considering that all EU member states are indirectly
represented in the G20). See OECD (2016), above n. 66.
81. R. Eccleston, P. Carroll & A. Kellow, ‘Handmaiden to the G20? The
OECD’s Evolving Role in Global Economic Governance’, Conference
paper presented at the 2010 Australian Political Studies Association
Conference: Connected Globe Conflicting Worlds, 27-29 September
2010.
82. See also J. Wouters and S. van Kerckhoven, ‘The OECD and the G20:
An Ever Closer Relationship?’, 43 George Washington International
Law Review 345 (2011).
83. ‘We reiterate the need to prevent base erosion and profit shifting and
we will follow with attention the ongoing work of the OECD in this
area.’ G20 Los Cabos Communiqué, 18-19 June 2012, at para. 48.
84. See the Tax Annex to the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders Declaration, 5
September 2013, at paras. 5 and 6.
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ties, the G20 does not only usurp the OECD’s resources
and time, but is also able to circumvent the formal deci-
sion-making process within the OECD and thus impair
the organisation’s functioning.85 Non-G20 OECD
members have seemingly little leeway to intervene in the
interplay between major powers represented in both the
G20 and the OECD, as illustrated in the tax haven list-
ing at the 2009 G20 London Summit, which include
some of the OECD’s members in the grey list, but
spared some G20 members.86 As such, the legitimacy of
the OECD in the BEPS Project has been challenged
from within, because non-G20 OECD members are
being bypassed in the main agenda-setting and decision-
making process and thus not involved in the Project in
the same way as the other OECD members.
Conversely, similar observations have been made
towards the non-OECD G20 countries. Christians
asserts that these countries only have a peripheral role,
because ‘despite the specter of the G20 as a “new model
of multilateral engagement,” the United States and
Europe continue to dominate a virtually impervious
institutional architecture of tax policymaking in the
form of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development’.87 Given the preponderance of the Uni-
ted States and Europe in the two institutions, critics
view the G20 as part of the continuing ‘G7-isation of
the world’, created to attain greater international sup-
port and legitimacy for the G7-driven OECD policies.88
The fact that the G7, led by the US Treasury and the
85. Wouters and Van Kerckhoven, above n. 82, at 370.
86. Ibid., at 370-1; D. Lesage, ‘The G20 and Tax Havens: Maintaining the
Momentum?’, Prepared for the conference ‘Governing the Global Econ-
omy: The Role of the G20’ University of Toronto – Munk School of
Global Affairs, at 4-5, available at: <www. g20. utoronto. ca/ biblio/ lesage
-tax -havens. pdf> (18 June 2010).
87. A. Christians, ‘Taxation in a Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the
OECD to the G20’, 5 Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy 19
(2010).
88. J.J. Kirton, ‘The G7 and China in the Management of the International
Financial System’, available at: <www. g7. utoronto. ca/ scholar/
kirton199903/ index. html> (3 November 1999), and more recently in
G20 Governance for a Globalized World (2016), at 73. For a similar
view that the ‘respective institutional capacities and roles of the G20
and the OECD suggest that the latter has a far greater role to play in
developing tax policy ideas and bringing them to consensus positions,
while the role of the former is in effect to syndicate those positions to a
larger audience’, as such, ‘this relationship prevents meaningful partici-
pation by developing countries because they are included only in the
diplomatic endorsement phase of policymaking rather than in the vital
stage of idea development and negotiation’, see Christians (2010),
above n. 87. In a comparative study on nine policy issues where devel-
oped and developing countries have conflicting views, Martinez-Diaz
concludes that the ‘G20 primarily served as a vehicle for mobilising sup-
port for the G7 policies, especially on issues about with the G7 cared
most strongly’, but, however, stayed silent or neutral on policies fav-
oured by the G24 (a group of developing countries) that would have
imposed heavier costs on G7 firms and governments. L. Martinez-Diaz,
‘The G20 after Eight Years: How Effective a Vehicle for Developing-
Country Influence?’, Global Economy and Development Working Paper
2007:12.
German finance ministry,89 formed the G20 with its
own members, arbitrarily handpicked the other twelve
member countries without any objective and transparent
selection criteria, strengthens this view. Consequently,
the legitimacy of both the G20 and the OECD is affec-
ted by their close collaboration. The relationship
between the G20 and the OECD thus serves as a dou-
ble-edged sword: it provides mutual gain, but by the
same token, it hampers and erodes each other’s legitima-
cy.
2.4 Ideological Complaints
The ideological complaint contends that international
law-making is subject to democratic deficits because
global institutions promote the ideological policy prefer-
ences of Western governmental elites, such as neoliberal
policies geared towards their economic growth.90 The
OECD has been viewed as the epitome of neo-liberal-
ism; a ‘market-liberal think tank’, founded as ‘the eco-
nomic conscience of the free world that aimed at the
construction of an international economic philosophy
that guarded the principles of liberal capitalism and the
interests of’ a community of ‘highly developed or
advanced capitalist countries’.91 The current architec-
ture of the international tax system, the origin of which
can be traced back to the work of four distinguished
economists from the Netherlands, Italy, the United
States and the United Kingdom who helped design it in
the 1920s,92 is built on the liberal concepts of tax neu-
trality, aimed at limiting the market distortions of dou-
ble taxation and stimulating the free flow of internation-
al trade and investments, with a bias towards taxing
rights for capital exporting countries under the OECD
model. However, the 2008 global financial crisis and the
2011 sovereign debt crisis, as well as the emergence of
the BRICS countries with their own successful econom-
ic models,93 have affected the economic ideology of
many traditional neoliberal countries in the OECD. As
observed in an OECD study on liberalisation and state
fragility:
Bastions of free market thinking are moving towards
tighter regulation, new austerity pacts, new debt
89. The G20 member countries were selected in 1999 by Timothy Geithner
at the US Treasury in a transatlantic telephone call with his German
Finance Ministry counterpart, Caio Koch-Weser, the selection process of
which was of questionable legitimacy according to Wade. R. Wade,
‘From Global Imbalances to Global Reorganizations’, 33 Cambridge
Journal of Economics 539, at 553 (2009). See also R. Wade and J. Ves-
tergaard, ‘Overhaul the G20 for the Sake of the G172’, Financial
Times, 21 October 2010.
90. Alvarez, above n. 27. See also Wheatley, above n. 27, at 31.
91. M. Schmelzer, The Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making
of Economic Growth Paradigm (2016), at 326 and 355.
92. Prof. Bruins of (the predecessor of) the Erasmus University Rotterdam,
Prof. Senator Einaudi of Turin University, Prof. Seligman of Columbia
University of New York, and Sir Josiah Stamp of London University. See
League of Nations, ‘Report on Double Taxation’ (1923) and ‘Report on
Double Taxation and Tax Evasion’ (1925).
93. See, e.g. M. Wolf, ‘The West No Longer Holds all the Cards’, Financial
Times, 23 September 2009 and C. Roberts, ‘Building the New World
Order BRIC by BRIC’, The European Financial Review, February-March
2011.
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instruments and calls for global taxes on financial
transactions. It could be said that many countries in
the OECD and outside it have moved well beyond
neo-liberalism and are now also sailing in uncharted
ideological waters.94
The recent US tax reform proposal for a ‘Destination
Based Cash Flow Tax’ (DBCFT), which would have a
protectionist impact on trade and investment due to its
‘border adjustment’ element, may illustrate this para-
digm shift.
Wheatley asserts that the imposition of global norms by
international economic institutions, often in the pursuit
of their – highly subjective and contestable – ideological
‘shared values’ of global justice and fairness, would be
acceptable ‘only if the policy issues under considerations
were not political, [i.e.] if they were not subject to disa-
greement by reasonable persons’.95 In the case of the
BEPS Project, policy makers, tax practitioners, NGOs
and the academia have heavily criticised the policy out-
comes. Critics argue that the BEPS proposals ‘offer a
patch-up of existing rules, making them even more
complex and in many cases contradictory, and do not
provide a coherent and comprehensive set of reforms’,
and call for a more fundamental reform.96 From the per-
spective of developing countries, which are dispropor-
tionally affected by BEPS since they derive a greater
share of their revenue from corporate taxes,97 the pro-
posed anti-BEPS Package does not address their specific
needs and many of the policy outcomes are considered
ineffective and tending to the lowest common denomi-
nator due to the resistance of some powerful OECD
states.98 This has resulted, for instance, in weak propos-
als on CFCs, interest deductibility and innovation box
schemes, all favoured by the United Kingdom.99 In par-
ticular, the CbC-reporting, which was considered the
most significant and major advance for developing
countries at first, has been rendered de facto ineffective
due to the high threshold of €750 million (thus targeting
only the very largest multinationals), cumbersome filing
arrangements (CbC-filing in the country of residence of
94. P. Middlebrook, ‘Building a “Fragile Consensus”: Liberalisation and
State Fragility’, OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers
2012:7.
95. Wheatley, above n. 27, at 31-32.
96. The BEPS Monitoring Group, ‘Overall Evaluation of the G20/OECD
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project’, available at: <https://
bepsmonitoringgroup. files. wordpress. com/ 2015/ 10/ general -evaluation.
pdf> (5 October 2015); IMF, ‘Spillovers in International Corporate Tax-
ation’, IMF Policy Paper (2014).
97. See IMF, above n. 96. A report commissioned by the Joint African
Union Commission/UN Economic Commission for Africa (AUC/ECA)
highlights that the African continent is losing more than $50 billion
annually through illicit financial outflows and that large corporations
(via the practices of commercial tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and
abusive transfer pricing) are by far the biggest culprits thereof, followed
by organized crime. High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, Report of
the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, Report com-
missioned by the AUC/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Plan-
ning and Economic Development (2015).
98. India’s comments in the UN Questionnaire on Countries’ experiences
regarding base erosion and profit shifting issues, above n. 18.
99. The BEPS Monitoring Group, above n. 96.
the ultimate parent and then shared between jurisdic-
tions through the accepted information exchange mech-
anisms), limited use of the information (exclusively for
assessing high-level transfer pricing and BEPS risks and
for economic and statistical analysis) and the fact that it
is not made publicly available.100 Especially considering
the fact that for many developing countries aggressive
transfer pricing practices by multinationals, in combina-
tion with the lack of information and comparable data
available to them to address this, is one of their biggest
BEPS concerns,101 restraining developing countries
from using CbC information for transfer pricing assess-
ments and adjustments does not provide them a panacea
against BEPS in the least. Other proposals in the BEPS
Project, such as mandatory binding arbitration, which
was primarily driven by the United States and suppor-
ted by the G7 and other developed countries,102 have
been considered outright unsuitable for developing
countries.103 In my opinion, the BEPS policy outcomes
are at odds with the G20 mandate that developing coun-
tries must reap the full benefit of the tax reform. From
the standpoint of legitimacy, this demonstrates that
Western-dominated global governance institutions such
as the OECD are ‘deeply inegalitarian’, because under
the pretence of shared interests and common values,
their ‘activities are primarily responsive to the interests
and concerns of the world’s most powerful states’.104 As
Edward H. Carr so eloquently put it: ‘The doctrine of
100. OECD, Action 13: Country-by-Country Reporting Implementation
Package (2015).
101. In a short summary of the responses to the UN questionnaire on how
some developing countries view the BEPS initiative and the G20/OECD
Action Plan, transfer pricing, including excessive management fees, IP,
royalties and R&D, was the most commonly raised BEPS issue. See the
UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters,
‘Responses to questionnaire for developing countries from the UN Sub-
committee on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’, E/C.18/2014/CRP.12,
available at: <www. un. org/ esa/ ffd/ wpcontent/ uploads/ 2015/ 01/
10STM_ CRP12_ BEPS. pdf> (1 December 2014). See also High Level
Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, above n. 97, at 37.
According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, transfer mispric-
ing cost African countries an average of $38.4 billion every year
between 2008 and 2010, which exceeds its inflows from either interna-
tional aid or foreign direct investment. K. Annan, ‘G20: How Global Tax
Reform Could Transform Africa’s Fortunes’, The Guardian, 5 September
2013.
102. G7 Leaders’ Declaration, Schloss Elmau, Germany, 7-8 June 2015. A
group of 20 countries have expressed interest in adopting a mandatory
binding arbitration: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germa-
ny, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the
US.
103. Sadiq, above n. 47. India has reportedly vetoed the inclusion of manda-
tory binding arbitration as one of the consensus item under the BEPS
Action Plan <www. livemint. com/ Politics/ rutMHggqQOm2htzcrI9K7I/
India -opposes -global -plan -to -make -tax -arbitration -binding. html> (23
September 2014). However, after the joint statement issued by the G7
leaders on their commitment to establish mandatory binding arbitration
in the BEPS Project, this is now included in the OECD’s work under
Action 14. Christian Aid finds the G7’s backing for mandatory binding
arbitration ‘deeply troubling’ <www. christianaid. org. uk/ pressoffice/
pressreleases/ june_ 2015/ christian -aid -alarmed -at -g7 -plan -for -
compulsory -tax -arbitration. aspx> (9 June 2015).
104. T. Christiano, ‘A Democratic Theory of Territory and Some Puzzles
about Global Democracy’, 37 Journal of Social Philosophy 81, at 94
(2006).
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the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious
moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged
groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant
position’. As such, ‘“[i]nternational order” and “inter-
national solidarity” will always be slogans of those who
feel strong enough to impose them on others’.105
3 Evaluating the BEPS Project’s
Legitimacy Concerns
The perceived legitimacy deficits of the BEPS Project
are multifaceted and the question arises whether these
critiques are justified. The contrast between domestic
democracy and global governance institutions is indeed
striking: the lack of electoral representation, direct citi-
zenry participation, global parliament, mechanisms for
holding decision-makers in the global institutions
accountable, etc. However, in response to the vertical
complaints, proponents may question the extent to
which democracy is required to evaluate the legitimacy
of OECD/G20 as global tax regulators in the BEPS
Project, considering the fact that some of the member
countries (e.g. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia) are not
democracies themselves. In addition, democracy is gov-
erned by the majority rule that accepts that a majority
can make binding decisions for everyone; however, this
rule is the precise antithesis of the principle of sovereign
equality, which demands that all states should have an
equal say in international decision-making.106 As such,
the notion of democracy at the level of global gover-
nance institutions is problematic and in conflict with the
basic tenet of international law. According to Gregory
Shaffer, global institutions should not be judged against
some ideal type of national democracy, but rather, ‘the
legitimacy of institutions should be viewed in a broader
sense as concerning the relative accountability of deci-
sion-making processes to those affected by them’.107
It is often argued that the principle of sovereign equality
– that no state can be bound without or against its will –
paralyses the functioning of global governance institu-
tions and thus hampers their legitimacy. Considering
the political salience surrounding BEPS, the G20 and
the OECD have chosen to orchestrate the BEPS Project
in such a way that will maximise the efficiency of their
global problem-solving capabilities while keeping the
larger public abreast of their progress. Indeed, legitima-
cy and effectiveness often go hand in hand. As Kal
Raustiala observed: ‘if state legitimacy is partly groun-
ded in effectiveness, effective international economic
105. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, An Introduction to the
Study of International Relations (1981), Reissued with a New Introduc-
tion and additional material by Michael Cox (2001), at 75 and 78.
106. C. Forcese, ‘Hegemonic Federalism: The Democratic Implications of the
UN Security Council’s “Legislative” Phase’, 38 Victoria University of
Wellington Law Review 175 (2007).
107. S. Shaffer, ‘Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: the Political,
Normative, and Practical Contexts’, 7 Journal of International Economic
Law 629, at 633 (2004).
institutions may be legitimate – because they are instru-
mentally useful – even though they lack accountability
in the usual sense’.108 In the absence of democratic
legitimacy, proponents may claim that the BEPS Project
has so-called output legitimacy through the positive
effects it has in terms of promoting economic growth,
improving social well-being of people across the globe,
restoring faith in governments, as well as restoring fair-
ness and coherence to the international tax systems and
ultimately stopping corporate tax abuse altogether,
which will offset its input legitimacy deficit.109 The fun-
damental problem here is that it is difficult to measure
the extent to which these positive output effects, if and
when they occur, could be attributed to the BEPS
Project. Besides, to judge the BEPS Project as legitimate
solely based on the prospect of its (possible) positive
future outcome is antagonistic and ambiguous at best.
In my view, the trade-off between legitimacy and effi-
ciency in the global decision-making is a slippery slope
that can lead to a bias towards the interests and concerns
of the most powerful states and undermine the trust of
the weaker states in the policy outcomes.110 Indeed, the
horizontal and ideological complaints lodged against the
BEPS Project suggest that the actual decision-making
rests in the hands of a small group of powerful states,
thus in fact governed by a ‘minority rule’, and that the
BEPS outcomes predominantly reflect their policy pref-
erences. This observation brings forward the complica-
ted relationship between legitimacy and power in the
interaction between states. Even though in principle
states possess equal sovereignty, the actual power for
them to exercise it may vary. Interestingly, Buchanan
rejects the idea that political equality among states is a
necessary condition for legitimacy at the international
level.
The fiction that international law is or ought to be a
system of equal sovereign states, founded on state
consent, is a distraction from the daunting task of
developing and implementing a genuinely more dem-
ocratic form of global governance in which those who
make, apply, and enforce international law are
108. K. Raustiala, ‘Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Eco-
nomic Law’, 6 Journal of International Economic Law 841, at 862
(2003).
109. The dichotomy between input-oriented legitimacy (‘government by the
people’) and output-oriented legitimacy (‘government for the people’)
was proposed by Fritz Scharpf. According to Scharpf, democratic legiti-
macy, which rests almost exclusively on trust in institutional arrange-
ments, is a two-dimensional concept that relies both on the democratic
quality of the governing processes (input) and on the problem-solving
quality of the adopted policies (output). From the input-oriented per-
spective, ‘political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the
will of the people – that is, if they can be derived from the authentic
preferences of the members of a community’. With regard to output-
oriented legitimacy arguments, ‘political choices are legitimate if and
because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constitu-
ency in question’. See F.W. Scharpf, ‘Problem-Solving Effectiveness and
Democratic Accountability in the EU’, MPIfG Working Paper 2003:1
and Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (1999), at 6.
110. See also Jokela, above n. 38, at 9.
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accountable to individuals and nonstate groups, not
only, or even primarily, to states.111
Instead, Buchanan asserts that the most serious demo-
cratic deficit in the global policymaking is ‘that a tech-
nocratic elite, lacking in democratic accountability to
individuals and nonstate groups, is playing an increas-
ingly powerful role in a system of regional and global
governance’.112 The emergence of the Platform for Col-
laboration on Tax, a central vehicle for enhanced coop-
eration between the technocrats employed at the IMF,
OECD, UN and WBG on inter-alia ‘the design and
implementation of standards for international tax mat-
ters’,113 including the development of toolkits, reports
and guidance notes on BEPS outcomes to better support
governments in the implementation thereof, may sub-
scribe to this concern.
The above analysis shows that there are some funda-
mental disagreements rooted in the concept of legitima-
cy for modern global governance institutions, under-
stood as the principle of sovereign equality on the one
hand, and a somewhat unrealistic notion that these insti-
tutions must share the same democratic standards as
nation-states, on the other. Clearly, it is still an evolving
concept and (unfortunately) beyond the scope of this
paper to substantiate the conditions for legitimacy that
will properly address all the concerns raised herein.
4 Conclusion
The BEPS Project, like any other OECD-led tax
reforms, is a reflection of international politics where
powerful states largely dictate the global course of
actions and the voice of weaker states is often marginal-
ised. And while the OECD lauds the Project as a ‘suc-
cess story’,114 in retrospect, it has fallen hostage to the
lowest common denominator agreements among its
leading member countries that are home to large multi-
nationals. In a time when anti-globalisation sentiments
are on the rise and nations are chasing the chimera of
Westphalian sovereignty and narrow concepts of nation-
al interest, the OECD could have served as a critical
counterforce to political opportunism, maybe even dis-
pelled its unwanted reputation as ‘the rich man’s club’
by providing an equal platform for developing countries
to participate in the initial agenda-setting and decision-
making process on BEPS. Instead, it maintained the sta-
tus quo and ignored the wider call for a much-needed
fundamental coordinated reform that addresses the
111. A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination (2003), at
289-90.
112. Ibid., at 289.
113. See the press release of 19 April 2016 on the IMF website (‘Internation-
al Organizations Take Major Step to Boost Global Cooperation in Tax
Matters’, Press Release No. 16/176) and attached ‘Concept Note’,
available at: <www. imf. org/ external/ np/ sec/ pr/ 2016/ pr16176. htm>
(last visited 17 September 2016).
114. P. Saint-Amans and R. Russo, ‘The BEPS Package: Promise Kept’, Bulle-
tin for International Taxation 236 (2016).
underlying problems and biases of the current interna-
tional tax system. If anything, the OECD’s initiative
seems to have exacerbated the race to the bottom as
countries are trying to compensate for multinationals’
increased tax bills caused by the BEPS proposals.
Despite its questionable legitimacy, many countries
around the world have accepted the outcomes of the
BEPS Project. Ironically, by doing so, they actually
award greater legitimacy to the OECD’s work, namely
through the process of broad-based implementation of
the BEPS minimum standards. Perhaps in the end,
legitimacy is only a matter of perception, a process in
which states come to terms with the international order
of power politics, possibly take refuge in mock-compli-
ance, and somehow find a way to justify, normalise and
internalise these so-called ‘international consensus’ and
‘global standards’ into domestic laws.
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